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CHALLENGING RESTRICTIVE FAMILY
DEFINITIONS IN ZONING ORDINANCES: CITY
OF SANTA BARBARA v. ADAMSON
Unrelated persons wishing to reside together as a family often con-
front zoning ordinances' which prohibit' or restrict3 nontraditional
1. Municipalities enact zoning regulations pursuant to the police power of the
state, often defined as the power to act for the health, safety, and general welfare of
the public. I R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING, § 2.01 (2d ed. 1976) [here-
inafter cited as ANDERSON]. The enactment of zoning restrictions constitutes an exer-
cise of legislative power. Typically, state constitutions vest in the state legislature the
legislative power of the state, Id at §§ 2.01-2.02. Consequently, a municipality, as a
political subdivision of the state, has no inherent power to zone. Such authority must
be delegated to it by the state legislature. Id at § 2.15. All of the states have adopted
enabling legislation, often patterned after the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, a
model act prepared by the Department of Commerce in the 1920's. Id at §§ 2.19-
2.21; 1 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN PLANNING LAW § 18.01 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
WILLIAMS]. See also ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CITY PLANNING AND ZONING,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD STATE ZONING EN-
ABLING ACT, (Rev. ed. 1926) [hereinafter cited as STANDARD ENABLING ACT], re-
printed in 1 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 354 (1978).
Since zoning ordinances are legislative acts, courts accord them a presumption of
constitutionality. ANDERSON, supra, § 3.14. " [A] legislative decision on such matters
may not be disturbed unless the legislature has exceeded its powers or acted in an
arbitrary or unreasonable manner." Id The litigant challenging the validity of the
ordinance bears the burden of proof, Id If the presumption is rebutted, the court
will examine the regulation to determine if the legislative body had a rational basis
for enacting it. Under the traditional due process analysis (see note 4 infra), three
criteria are considered. First, is the goal sought a legitimate objective through the
exercise of the police power? Second, are the means employed reasonably necessary
for the accomplishment of the purpose? Third, are the means unduly burdensome
upon the affected individuals? A. GODSCHALK, D. BROWER, L. McBENNETT, B. VES-
TAL, and D. HERR, CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES OF GROWTH MANAGEMENT 45-48
(1979) [hereinafter cited as GODSCHALK].
Courts normally require that the means employed to effectuate the legislative pur-
pose bear a rational relation to the stated objective. If the means employed to obtain a
legitimate objective are reasonable, courts will require a substantial injury before in-
validating the ordinance. GODSCHALK, suprat See also A. MOSKOWITZ, EXCLUSION-
ARY ZONING LITIGATION 83 (1977).
With regard to the scope of objectives permissible under the police power, see
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), where the issue before the Court was whether a
municipality could use its power of eminent domain in conjunction with its police
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living arrangements. The United States Supreme Court made a rare
foray into the field of zoning4 in 1974 and sustained the constitution-
power to obtain land for slum redevelopment. The Court, per Justice Douglas, spoke
expansively of the city's power to act for the public welfare:
Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the
public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive. In such cases the
legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the public needs to be
served by social legislation...
Public safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and order-these
are some of the more conspicuous examples of the traditional application of the
police powers to municipal affairs. Yet they merely illustrate the scope of the
power and do not delimit it...
Id at 32.
As illustrated by Berman, the traditional analysis manifested extreme judicial def-
erence toward local zoning decisions. GODSCHALK, supra, at 45. In the 1970's, courts
in several jurisdictions moderated their attitude. The trend was foreshadowed by the
now classic dissent of Justice Hall of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Vickers v.
Township Comm of Gloucester Townshp, 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962), appeal
dismissed, 371 U.S. 233 (1963):
While it has long been conventional for courts to test the validity of local legisla-
tion by the criterion of whether a fairly debatable issue is presented, and if so to
sustain it, it makes all the difference in the world how a court deals with that
criterion. Proper judicial review to me can be nothing less than an objective,
realistic consideration of the setting-the evils or conditions sought to be reme-
dies, a full and comparative appraisal of the public interest involved and the
private rights affected, both from the local and broader aspects, and a thorough
weighing of all factors, with government entitled to win if the scales are at least
balanced or even a little less so. Of course, such a process involves judgment and
the measurement can never be mathematically exact. But that is what judges are
for-to evaluate and protect all interests, including those of individuals and mi-
norities, regardless of personal likes or views of wisdom, and not merely to rub-
ber-stamp governmental action in a kind of judicial laissez-faire. Id at 260, 181
A.2d at 144. This new approach altered the traditional analysis in two important
ways. First, courts became willing to shift the burden of proof to the municipal-
ity after a preliminary showing, thereby challenging the presumption of validity
previously accorded zoning ordinances. Second, the relationship between the
regulatory device or classification and the zoning goal was scrutinized, in terms
of both the "fit" and their propriety. See GODSCHALK, supra, at 48-49; WIL-
LIAMS, supra, at § 5.05.
2. E.., City of Des Plaines v. Trottner, 34 Ill.2d 432, 216 N.E.2d (1966) (single-
family residence restricted to person related by blood, marriage, or legal adoption and
not more than one gratuitous guest).
3. See, e.g., notes 12 and 35 infra.
4. American zoning law evolved with minimal guidance from the Supreme Court.
In the landmark decision of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 272 U.S. 365 (1926), the
Court upheld comprehensive zoning as a permissible exercise of the police power.
The Court ruled that zoning was not an unconstitutional deprivation of due process
unless the regulations were "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial
relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare." Id at 395. The
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RESTRICTIVE FAMILY DEFINITIONS
ality of residential zoning regulations which restrict the number of
unrelated persons permitted to live in a single-family unit while plac-
ing no size limitations on related groups.' Subsequently, the
Supreme Court of New Jersey rejected the Supreme Court's reason-
ing and invalidated a similar zoning ordinance by relying upon state
constitutional grounds.6 In City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 7 the
California Supreme Court followed New Jersey's departure by hold-
ing that a zoning ordinance restricting the occupancy of a single-fam-
ily dwelling by unrelated persons violates the state constitution.'
Defendants9 shared a ten-bedroom house owned by one of the de-
fendants.'1 The defendant's property was situated in a zoning district
permitting only single-family use." The governing ordinance de-
fined "family" as either persons related by blood, marriage or legal
adoption, or a group of up to five persons living together as a single
housekeeping unit. 2 The twelve members of defendants' household
zoning plan approved by the Court, involving the division of the community into
districts with restrictions upon the use of all property in such districts, became the
pattern for subsequent zoning ordinances (hence the term "Euclidian" zoning). See
generally, ANDERSON, supra note 1, at §§ 3.09-.10, 9.01.
In the only other zoning case decided by the Court prior to the past decade, Nectow
v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928), it sustained an as applied challenge to the
constitutionality of a zoning ordinance found to be arbitrary and unreasonable.
5. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
6. State v. Baker, 81 N.J. 99, 405 A.2d 368 (1979).
7. 27 Cal.3d 123, 610 P.2d 436, 164 Cal. Rptr. 539 (1980).
8. Id at 134, 610 P.2d at 442, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 545.
9. The city brought suit against Adamson, the owner of the house, and several
other persons residing there. The Court characterized the residents of the home as in
their late twenties and thirties with varied occupations, including a businesswoman, a
lawyer, a real estate agent, and a graduate student. Id at 127, 610 P.2d at 438, 164
Cal. Rptr. at 541.
10. Id Defendant's house had a total of twenty-four rooms, including six bath-
rooms. Id
11. Id
12. Id The Santa Barbara Housing Code defines family as:
1. An individual, or two (2) or more persons related by blood, marriage, or
legal adoption living together as a single housekeeping unit in a dwelling unit
... 2. A group not to exceed five (5) persons, excluding servants, living to-
gether as a single housekeeping unit in a dwelling unit.
SANTA BARBARA HOUSING CODE § 28.04.230, cited at 27 Cal.3d at 127, 610 P.2d at
437-38, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 540-41.
The ordinance enumerated several zoning objectives, including the development
and maintenance of "a suitable environment for family life," a ban on commercial
activity "injurious to the preservation of a residential environment" and assuring a
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were not related by blood, marriage or adoption. 3 After warning the
defendants that their living arrangements violated the ordinance, the
city of Santa Barbara sued for a restraining order and injunctive re-
lief. 4 The California Supreme Court found that the ordinance in-
fringed upon the right of privacy guaranteed by the state
constitution.' 5 Adopting a "strict scrutiny" standard of review,' 6 the
Court concluded that the city failed to demonstrate a compelling
public interest to justify the restriction. 7
Ascribing meaning to the term "family" functions as the critical
link in a zoning scheme which classifies residential districts 8 accord-
low density in residential districts. SANTA BARBARA HOUSING CODE § 28.15.005,
cited at 27 Cal.3d at 132, 610 P.2d at 440-41, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 543-44.
13. 27 Cal.3d at 127, 610 P.2d at 438, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 541. The Court noted,
however, that members of the group shared expenses, rotated chores, and provided
emotional support and stability for each other. Id
14. Id The city sought a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and
permanent injunction. The trial court issued a restraining order and later a prelimi-
nary injunction. Id The decision was affirmed on appeal in an unpublished opinion.
City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, Civ. No. 54312 (Ct. App. Mar. 19, 1979).
15. 27 Cal.3d at 134, 610 P.2d at 442, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 545. The constitutional
provision relied on by the court states:
All persons are by nature free and independent and have unalienable rights.
Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing,
and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness and
privacy.
CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 1.
The State of California added the privacy provision by referendum in 1972. For a
discussion of the court's interpretation of the provision prior to this case, see notes 70-
71 infra. See also, The Supreme Court of Caifornia 1974-1975, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 239,
347-369 (1976); Note, Rediscovering the California Declaration of Aights, 26 HASTINGS
L.J. 481, 502-504 (1974).
16. See note 39 infra.
17. 23 CaL3d at 132, 610 P.2d at 441, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 544.
18. Pursuant to its zoning powers (see note I supra), a municipality may establish
residential districts and prescribe permissible uses and regulations within that district.
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); STANDARD ENABLING ACT, supra
note l, § 2; ANDERSON, supra note 1, at § 9.24. One type of residential use restriction
involves the regulation of residential building types; Le., regulations designating a
district for either single- or multiple-family dwellings. See generally WILLIAMS, supra
note 1, ch. 50. Despite some early criticism (see Harmon v. City of Peoria, 27 N.E.2d
525 (Ill. 1940); Merrill v. City of Wheaton, 190 N.E. 918 (Ill. 1934)), the constitution-
ality of single-family residential districts is generally assumed. See Village of Belle
Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S.1 (1974); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926);
Miller v. Bd. of Public Works of Los Angeles, 195 Cal. 477, 234 P. 381 (1925), appeal
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ing to the number of families permitted per residential structure.19
Municipalities may use one of several approaches in defining the
term within the zoning ordinance.2" The zoning ordinance may nar-
rowly restrict household occupancy to persons related by blood, mar-
riage, or adoption.2 Alternatively, the statutory definition of
"family" may extend to a specified number of unrelated persons in
addition to persons having the requisite legal relationships. 22
Regardless of the approach, a narrow definition of the term "fam-
ily" results in the exclusion of diverse group living arrangements
from single-family districts.23  Municipalities justify the classifica-
dismissed, 273 U.S. 781 (1927); Brett v. Building Comm'r of Brookline, 250 Mass. 73,
145 N.E. 269 (1924). See also WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at § 50.02.
Courts use several rationales to justify the segregation of residential districts by
building types. First, districts with more restrictive building types often have a lower
density. This in turn results in reduced traffic, congestion and noise, and limits the
burden on public facilities and services. Second, the transiency traditionally associ-
ated with the occupants of multiple-family units is deemed incompatible with stable
residential neighborhoods. Third, multiple-family dwellings may be aesthetically in-
compatible with single-family units. Finally, the presence of multiple-family dwell-
ings in residential neighborhoods may lower property values. See WILLIAMS, supra
note 1, at ch. 51.
19. WILLIAMS, supra note 1; at § 51.01.
20. A municipality may also elect to leave the term undefined. When faced with
such an ordinance, courts attempt to determine if the contested living arrangement
constitutes a common housekeeping unit. The biological or legal relationship of the
inhabitants is not determinative. See Brady v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App.2d 69, 19
Cal. Rptr. 242 (1962) (ordinance restricting dwelling units to "single-family" con-
strued to mean persons living on the premises as a single housekeeping unit, and not
to require consanguinity or affinity of household members). See also Rademan v.
City and County of Denver, 186 Colo. 250, 526 P.2d 1325 (1974) (ordinance permit-
ting only "single-family units" held to prohibit two married couples and two single
persons from residing together where evidence refuted claim of a common house-
keeping unit); Planning and Zoning Comm'n v. Synanon Foundation, Inc., 153 Conn.
305, 216 A.2d 442 (1966) ("one-family" district prohibits a large, ever-changing group
of unrelated persons). The common housekeeping unit criterion may be purposely
adopted by municipalities as a less restrictive alternative to the definitional ap-
proaches discussed in the text. See State v. Baker, 81 N.J. 99, 405 A.2d 368 (1979);
Berger v. State, 71 N.J. 206, 364 A.2d 993 (1976). See also notes 59 and 75-77 and
accompanying text inra.
21. Courts tend to interpret ordinances requiring a blood or legal relationship
broadly so as to include any related group. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at § 52.02. Such
a construction may now be constitutionally compelled in light of the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), discussed at
note 45 infra.
22. See, e.g., note 12 supra.
23. In addition to households typified by the group in Adamson, (see note 9
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tions as an effective means of furthering traditional zoning objec-
tives.24 These may include preserving the residential character of a
neighborhood or promoting an environment conducive to family
life.25 Strict residency requirements serve to restrict behavior and
lifestyles deemed incompatible with such uses.26 Courts also explain
the classifications as a device to control overcrowding and conges-
tion.27 Prohibiting or restricting the size of certain groups, especially
those whose size may vary unpredictably, provides a simple means of
controlling population in a neighborhood.28
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas,29 courts divided over the validity of restrictive definitions of
the term "family."30 Courts in several jurisdictions found them inva-
lid,31 reasoning that the power to zone does not permit a municipality
supra), restrictive definitions of family can exclude group homes for juveniles, dis-
cussed at notes 47-49 and accompanying text infra. Other affected groups include
fraternities and sororities, City of Schenectady v. Delta Chi Fraternity, 5 App. Div.2d
14, 168 N.Y.S.2d 754 (1957) (fraternity not permitted in single-family district); Cas-
sidy v. Triebel, 337 I1. App. 117, 85 N.E.2d 461 (1948) (sorority does not constitute a
family), and religious groups, Carroll v. City of Miami Beach, 198 So.2d 643 (Fla.
App. 1967) (Mother Superior and a group of novices held to be a single family);
Missionaries of Our Lady of La Sallette v. Village of Whitefish Bay, 267 Wis. 609, 66
N.W.2d 627 (1954) (group of up to eight priests held to be a single family). See also
WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at § 52.01; Note, "Burning the House to Roast the Pig":
Unrelated Individuals and Single-Family Zoning's Blood Relation Criterion, 58 COR-
NELL L. Rlv. 138 (1972); Note, The Dfnition of Family in Single-Family Zoning, 42
MONTANA L. REv. 165 (1981); Comment, Zoning According to Biological or Legal
Relationships is Violative ofthe New Jersey Constitution, 11 SErON HALL L. REV. 112
(1980); Note, Constitutional Implications ofRestrictive Defnitions ofFamily in Zoning
Ordinances, 17 SouTH DAKOTA L. REv. 203 (1972).
24. The zoning objectives cited often resemble those given in support of restric-
tions on residential building types. See note 18 supra.
25. E.g., State v. Baker, 81 N.J. 99, 405 A.2d 368 (1979).
26. 1 P. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS, § 3.04[l] (1978) [hereinafter
cited as ROHAN].
27. E.g., Timberlake v. Kenkel, 369 F. Supp. 456 (E.D. Wis. 1974), rev'd without
opinion, 510 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1975); City of Des Plaines v. Trottner, 34 Il.2d 432,
216 N.E.2d 116 (1966).
28. See Palo Alto Tenants' Union v. Morgan, 321 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Cal. 1970),
aft'dper curiam, 487 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 910 (1974) (mu-
nicipality may rationally decide that the size of "voluntary" families have no upper
limit while the average size of the traditional family can be estimated).
29. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
30. ROHAN, supra note 26, at § 3.0411].
31. See notes 32 and 33 infra.
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to regulate the internal composition of households32 or to enact ordi-
nances aimed at maintaining established residential patterns.33
In Belle Terre,34 the Supreme Court upheld a zoning ordinance
which permitted only single-family dwellings within the municipality
and which restricted the occupancy of such buildings to groups re-
lated by blood or marriage or to no more than two unrelated per-
sons.35 The Second Circuit found the ordinance an unconstitutional
denial of equal protection. 6 The Supreme Court,37 however, ruled
32. See City of Des Plaines v. Trottner, 34 Ill.2d 432, 216 N.E.2d 116 (1966);
Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 281 A.2d 513 (1971);
Gabe Collins Realty, Inc. v. City of Margate City, 112 N.J. Super. 341, 271 A.2d 430
(1970); Marino v. Mayor and Council of Norwood, 77 N.J. Super. 587, 187 A.2d 217
(1963).
33. Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd, 416 U.S. 1
(1974). But see Palo Alto Tenants' Union v. Morgan, 321 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Cal.
1970), a'dper curiam, 487 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 910 (1974)
where the court upheld an ordinance restricting single-family units to persons biologi-
cally or legally related or unrelated groups not exceeding four persons. A communal
group challenged the ordinance as an unconstitutional infringement upon the right of
family privacy and freedom of association. The court held that the asserted constitu-
tional interests did not extend to unrelated persons living together as a family. 321 F.
Supp. at 911. The court drew a sharp distinction between the traditional family and
the plaintiffs' "voluntary" family on the basis of biology, history, and law:
The traditional family is an institution reinforced by biological and legal ties
which are difficult, or impossible, to sunder. It plays a role in educating and
nourishing the young which, far from being "voluntary," is often compulsory.
Finally, it has been a means for uncounted millenia, of satisfying the deepest
emotional and physical needs of human beings.
Id
34. 416 US. 1 (1974).
35. The challenged ordinance defined family to mean:
[o]ne or more persons related by blood, adoption, or marriage, living and cook-
ing together as a single housekeeping unit. . .A number of persons but not
exceeding two (2) living and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit
though not related by blood, adoption, or marriage ...
BUILDING ZONE ORDINANCE OF THE VILLAGE OF BELLE TERRE, N.Y., Art. I, § D-
1.35a (June 8, 1970).
The owners of a house and their six student tenants brought suit. They sought to
have the ordinance declared unconstitutional as a violation of their fundamental
rights of privacy, association and travel, (see note 39 supra) and a denial of equal
protection. 416 U.S. at 8-9. The District Court upheld the ordinance. 367 F. Supp.
136 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), rev'd, 476 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd., 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
36. 476 F.2d 806, 816 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). The Second Cir-
cuit's equal protection analysis is noteworthy. The court declined to review the ordi-
nance under the traditional "permissive" standard (see note 39 supra) because of a
perceived alteration in the Supreme Court's test of legislative classifications. The new
standard was said to "permit consideration to be given to evidence of the nature of
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that zoning regulations purporting to preserve residential neighbor-
hoods fell within a municipality's broad power to zone for the public
welfare.38 Finding that the resulting exclusion of the plaintiffs impli-
cated no fundamental constitutional rights, 9 the Court reviewed the
the unequal classification under attack, the pature of the rights adversely affected, and
the governmental interest urged in support of it." Id at 814. The court found a
heightened standard to be especially appropriate when the classification involves "in-
dividual human rights of groups as opposed to business regulations." Id at 815. The
test applied inquired "whether the legislative classification is infact substantially re-
lated to the object of the statute." 1d at 814. The court found that the most plausible
objective of the statute was the maintenance of local social preferences. Such a goal
under the guise of zoning laws was found impermissible. Id at 816. Assuming that
the ordinance was designed to meet a more traditional zoning objective, such as con-
trolling density, the availability of less restrictive means to achieve that goal would
still leave the ordinance "vulnerable." Id at 817. See generally Comment, Equal
Protection and Exclusionary Zoning: Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 60 VA. L. REV.
163 (1974). See also, Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term, Foreword, In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court. A Modelfor a New Equal Protection, 86
HARV. L. REV. 1, 10-20 (1972); Note, "Burning the House to Roast the Pig".- Unre-
latedlndividuals and Single-Family Zoning's Blood Relation Criterion, 58 CORNELL L.
REv. 138, 151-155 (1972).
37. Justice Douglas wrote for the Court. Justice Brennan dissented on jus-
ticiability grounds. The tenants moved from the house before the case reached the
Supreme Court. Since the case involved a question concerning their constitutional
rights, Justice Brennan contended that the owners were not qualified to allege denial
of another party's rights under the traditional court standards. 416 U.S. I at 10. Jus-
tice Marshall filed a dissent, affirming the Second Circuit's decision. He found that
the students' "fundamental" right of privacy had been violated. Id at 11.
38. Id at 9. In a flourish reminiscent of his opinion in Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S.
26 (1954) (see note I supra), Justice Douglas observed:
A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted are
legitimate guidelines in a land-use project addressed to family needs. This goal
is a permissible one within Berman v. Parker ..... The police power is not
confined to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay
out zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion
and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people.
Id
39. Id at 7. "Fundamental" rights constitute one category of interests in the War-
ren and Burger Courts' mode of equal protection analysis. Traditionally, the Court
has applied one of two standards when reviewing legislative classifications. Under
the "permissive" standard, the statutory scheme was not to be set aside "if any state of
facts reasonably [might] be conceived to justify it." See McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420, 426 (1961). A "strict" test of equal protection is invoked if the challenger
demonstrates that the legislative scheme in question utilizes either a suspect classifica-
tion or impinges on a fundamental right. Under the strict test, the government must
demonstrate that the classification "promoted a compelling governmental interest."
See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969). See generally L. TRIBE, AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-7 (1978).
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classification under the deferential standard accorded to social and
economic legislation.'
Three years later the Court indicated in Moore v. City of East
Cleveland'" that the exclusionary effect of some residential use re-
strictions may violate the Constitution.42 In East Cleveland, the ordi-
nance restricted single-family dwelling units to members of a single
family, defined to include only certain categories of related persons.43
A fragmented court' held the ordinance invalid, ruling that a zoning
ordinance which intruded upon extended family relationships in the
absence of an important governmental interest violated the four-
40. 416 U.S. at 8. The Court required that the classification drawn be "reason-
able, not arbitrary," id citing Royster Giano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1917),
and bear "a rational relationship to a [permissible] state objective," 416 U.S. at 8,
citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). Some commentators have concluded that
the Court's failure to use a heightened standard of review in Belle Terre at a time
when it was using it in other contexts (see e.g., United States Department of Agricul-
ture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973)) (held invalid a regulation which denied food
stamps to households containing unrelated persons)) indicates a predilection by the
Court to use greater judicial restraint when reviewing local zoning decisions. GOD-
SCHALK, supra note 1, at 87-88. See also The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARv. L.
REV. 41, 127-128 (1974). Nevertheless, the Belle Terre decision has received unfavor-
able reaction from commentators because of its truncated consideration of the exclu-
sionary aspects of the zoning regulation. Williams & Doughty, Studies in Legal
Realism: Mount Laurel Belle Terre, and Berman, 29 RUTGERS L. REv. 73 (1975);
Recent Development, Supreme Court Upholds Restrictive Definition of Family in Zon-
ing Ordinance, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 299 (1975); Note, No Dogs, Cats, or Voluntary
Families Allowed-Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 24 DE PAUL L. REV. 784 (1975);
Comment, Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas: Belle Terre is a Nice Place to Visit-But
Only "Families" May Live There, 8 URBAN L. ANN. 193 (1974).
41. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
42. See generally Note, Constitutionally Protected Notions of Family, 19 B.C.L.
REv. 959 (1978); Comment, .4 Zoning Ordinance which Places Limits on which Mem-
bers of an Extended Family May Live Together in a Single-Family Dwelling Infringes
on Protected Family Interest, has only a Marginal Relationshp to Permissible Zoning
Objectives and thereby Violates Due Process Requirements: Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 27 DRAKE L. REV. 565 (1977-78); Comment, Moore v. City of East Cleve-
land- Freedom of Personal Choicefor the Extended Family, 10 Sw. U. L. REv. 651
(1978).
43. Id at 496. The city's definition of family was unusually complicated. One
commentator interpreted it to include "a nuclear family (i.e., husband, wife, and
kids), but only a limited number of extended families. The latter could include one
dependent child and his/her children, but (if so) not another dependent child or any
children of another child." WILLIAMS, supra note 1, § 52.02 at 51. The defendant
lived with her son and two grandsons, who were first cousins.
44. Six justices wrote opinions. A plurality of the justices joined the Court's opin-
ion. 431 U.S. at 495.
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teenth amendment's due process clause.45
Unrelated groups facing exclusion have successfully challenged
"single-family" ordinances in several jurisdictions 46 notwithstanding
Belle Terre. Courts in a number of states47 have sustained challenges
to ordinances which exclude group homes from single-family dis-
tricts.48 To overcome the sanction seemingly granted to restrictive
ordinances by Belle Terre, such courts frequently cite two factors sup-
porting invalidation. First, the state has an important interest in fa-
cilitating efforts to raise handicapped and foster children in a home
environment, an interest which should not be frustrated by a local
zoning restriction. Second, invalidation of such ordinances does not
countermand Belle Terre since group homes often closely resemble
traditional families. 4
9
45. Id at 499. The Court reasoned that substantive due process protected ex-
tended family relationships because of the deeply rooted notion of "sanctity of the
family" in the nation's history and traditions. Id at 503-04. The Court noted that
"when a city undertakes such intensive regulation of the family, neither Belle Terre
nor Euclid governs; the usual judicial deference is inappropriate." Id at 499. The
ordinance was then examined vis-a-vis "the importance of the governmental interests
advanced and the extent to which they are served by the challenged regulation." Id
at 499.
46. See notes 47-50 infra.
47. See Hessling v. City of Broomfield, 193 Colo. 124, 563 P.2d 12 (1977); Berger
v. State, 71 N.J. 206,364 A.2d 998 (1976); City of White Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d
300, 313 N.E.2d 756, 357 N.Y.S. 449 (1974); Children's Home of Easton v. City of
Easton, 53 Pa. Commw. Ct. 216, 417 A.2d 830 (Commw. Ct. 1980). But see Lakeside
Youth Service v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 51 Pa. Commw. Ct. 485, 414 A.2d 1115
(Commw. Ct. 1980); Carroll v. Washington Township Zoning Comm'n, 63 Ohio St.
2d 249, 408 N.E.2d 191 (1980).
Several states have enacted legislation to control this type of exclusionary zoning.
See Hopperton,.4 State Legislative Strategyfor Ending Exclusionary Zoning of Com-
muniy Homes, 19 URBAN L. ANN. 47 (1980).
48. E.g., Berger v. State, 71 N.J. 206, 364 A.2d 998 (1976); Abbott House v. Vil-
lage of Tarrytown, 34 A.D.2d 821, 312 N.Y.S. 2d 841 (1970). See generally Develop-
ments in the Law-Zoning, 91 HARV. L. Rv. 1427, 1574-77 (1978).
49. Eg., Hessling v. City of Broomfield, 193 Colo. 124, 563 P.2d 12 (1977) (mar-
ried couple and six unrelated children constituted a family since the children were
indistinguishable from adopted children and group maintained a single housekeeping
unit); City of White Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d 300, 313 N.E. 2d 756, 357 N.Y.S.2d
449 (1974). In Ferraioll, the ordinance limited families to related persons. Id at 304,
313 N.E.2d at 758, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 451. Nevertheless, the Court ruled that the mem-
bers of the group home constituted a family within the meaning of the ordinance,
stating:
Thus the city has a proper purpose in largely limiting the use in a zone to single
family units. But if it goes beyond to require that the relationship in the family
unit be those of blood or adoption, then its definition of family might be too
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The New Jersey Supreme Court expanded the scope of the trend in
State v. Baker5" by invalidating an ordinance prohibiting more than
four unrelated persons from living together.51 In doing so, the Baker
court explicitly rejected Belle Terre.52 The court grounded its deci-
sion in the state substantive due process doctrine developed in earlier
exclusionary zoning cases.53 Baker extends that doctrine to include a
prohibition against the exclusion of groups constituting bona fide
households from single-family districts. 4
restrictive ... So long as the group home bears the generic characteristic of a
family unit as a relatively permanent household, and is not a framework for tran-
sients or transient living, it conforms to the purpose of the ordinance.
Id at 305-06, 313 N.E.2d at 758, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 452-53.
50. 81 N.J. 99, 405 A.2d 368 (1979).
51. Id at 104, 405 A.2d at 370. The defendant, an ordained minister, and his
four-member family shared a home with a woman and her three children. The de-
fendant contended that the living arrangement arose from religious convictions. Id
52. 81 N.J. at 112,405 A.2d at 374. The court declared: "We find the reasoning of
Belle Terre to be both unpersuasive and inconsistent with the results reached by this
Court in Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, [59 N.J. 241, 281 A.2d 513
(1971)] and Berger v. State, [71 N.J. 206, 364 A.2d 998 (1976)]. Hence we do not
choose to follow it." Id
53. See S. Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151,
336 A.2d 713 (1975), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975) (zoning
ordinance that does not meet the fundamental needs for adequate housing possessed
by people of all income levels who reside within a region does not serve the public
welfare and is invalid). In Mount Laurel, the New Jersey Supreme Court generally
held that the state constitution required that zoning regulations promote the welfare
of the public as a whole. See N.J. CONST. art. I, par. 1. The broader view of the
zoning function expressed in the opinion stands in sharp contrast to that of the
Supreme Court in Belle Terre. Williams and Doughty, Studies in Legal Realism:
Mount Laurel, Belle Terre, andBerman, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 73 (1975). In Oakwood
at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481,371 A.2d 1192 (1977) the court
held invalid a zoning ordinance which precluded any substantial amounts of new
housing for low- and moderate-income households in the city and region. See also
Home Builders League of S, Jersey, Inc. v. Township of Berlin, 81 N.J. 127,405 A.2d
381 (1979) (zoning ordinance prescribing minimum floor areas for residents held in-
valid as unrelated to legitimate zoning purpose). At the present time, however, the
New Jersey Supreme Court appears to be reconsidering the Mount Laurel and Oak-
wood decisions. See MANDELKER & CUNNINGHAM, PLANNING AND CONTROL OF
LAND DEVELOPMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 93 (1981 Supp.).
54. 81 N.J. at 113, 405 A.2d at 375. Baker contributes to the New Jersey zoning
philosophy a requirement that "zoning restrictions be accomplished in the manner
which least impacts upon the rights of individuals to order their lives as they see fit."
81 N.J. at 114, n.10, 405 A.2d at 375, n.10. See generally Note, The Defnition of
Family in Single-Family Zoning, 42 MONTANA L. REV. 165 (1981); Comment, Zoning
According to Biological or Legal Relationships is Violative of the New Jersey Constitu-
tion, 11 SETON HALL L. REV. 112 (1980).
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Baker does not prohibit single-family districts nor regulations
designed to preserve neighborhoods suitable for family life.5 Under
the New Jersey due process requirements, however, a zoning classifi-
cation must bear a substantial relation to the city's objective.5 6 Re-
strictive family definitions lacked the required relationship. 7 The
court also concluded that the city could obtain neighborhoods of the
desired character by means more direct and less restrictive.58 As an
alternative to the restrictive classification, the court suggested that
municipalities limit single-family districts to bona fide housekeeping
units,59 and that local officials define such a unit in a reasonable
manner.60 In conjunction with this flexible zoning unit, the court
encouraged the use of space-related occupancy regulations-limiting
occupants in relation to floor area or sleeping or bathroom facili-
ties-to control overcrowding. 6'
The California Supreme Court invalidated the zoning restriction in
City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson 62 using an alternative legal theory.
Interpreting the privacy provision in the California Constitution to
include the right to privacy in the choice of household companions, 63
the Court found that the ordinance impinged upon a fundamental
interest under California law.' The ordinance failed under the re-
55. 81 NJ. at 109, 405 A.2d at 372.
56. Id at 105, 405 A.2d at 371.
57. Id at 107, 405 A.2d at 372-73.
58. Id at 108, 405 A.2d at 372. The court qualified its condemnation of the ordi-
nance. "[D]espite the inexactitude and overinclusiveness of such regulations, we
would be reluctant to condemn them in the absence of less restrictive alternatives.
Such options do, however, exist." Id
59. Id at 109, 405 A.2d at 372. The court commented that "[t]he courts of this
and other states have often noted that the core concept underlying single-family living
is not biological or legal relationships but, rather, its character as a single housekeep-
ing unit." Id at 108, 405 A.2d at 372.
60. Id at 109 n.3, 405 A.2d at 372-73 n.3. The court established the parameters
within which the term could be defined. Groups bearing the "generic character of a
family unit as a relatively permanent household" must be permitted. Id at 108-09,
405 A.2d at 372 citing City of White Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d 300, 313 N.E.2d
756, 357 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1974). On the other hand, uses incompatible with residential
areas could be excluded. These included commerical residences, non-familial institu-
tional uses, and boarding homes. 81 N.J. at 109, 405 A.2d at 372.
61. Id at 110, 405 A.2d at 373.
62. 27 Cal.3d 123, 610 P.2d 436, 164 Cal. Rptr. 539 (1980).
63. Id at 130, 610 P.2d at 439, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 542.
64. Id at 131, 610 P.2d at 440, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 543.
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suiting strict scrutiny test.65
The Adamson court's reliance upon the privacy provision instead
of other broader guarantees enumerated in the California Constitu-
tion66 suggests a desire to limit the scope of the decision. Indeed, the
rationale does appear narrower than the substantive due process val-
ues which underlies the holding in Baker.67 The privacy rationale
suggests that residential zoning restrictions which do not interfere
with the composition of households may be valid even though they
retain other exclusionary features.68 In contrast, the holding in
Baker may represent one plank in a broad-based scheme to counter
the exclusionary effect of zoning decisions.69
The scope of the Adamson decision remains elusive, however, be-
cause of the uncertain content of the constitutional privacy provi-
sion.7" Since its addition to the California Constitution in 1972, the
California Supreme Court consistently interpreted the privacy provi-
sion as a restraint on the surreptitious collection of information by
police agents.7 ' The provision's newly-found meaning in the field of
65. Id
66. For the text of the "inalienable rights" section of the California Constitution,
of which the privacy guarantee is one element, see note 15 supra. Ironically, the
source of New Jersey's substantive due process doctrine is an identical provision in its
constitution absent the right of privacy. N.J. CONST. art. I, par. 1. The Baker court,
however, implied such a right. 81 N.J. 99 at 114 n.10, 405 A.2d 368 at 375 n.10.
67. See note 53 supra.
68. Thus, for example, the Adamson rationale may not prohibit zoning ordinances
that have the effect of excluding certain groups from neighborhoods or even a city
because of strict housing regulations. New Jersey courts using the substantive due
process doctrine have held this type of ordinance invalid. See Home Builders League
of S. Jersey, Inc. v. Township of Berlin, 81 N.J. 127,405 A.2d 381 (1979); Oakwood at
Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 371 A.2d 1192 (1977).
69. See note 53 supra.
70. Interpretation of the provision is complicated by the lack of a legislative his-
tory, Since the right of privacy was added to the state constitution by referendum (see
note 15 supra), brochures used in the referendum campaign have been used as a sub-
stitute. White v. Davis, 13 Cal.3d 757, 774, 533 P.2d 222, 233, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 105
(1975). The literature indicates a concern for "government snooping and data collect-
ing." Id
71. In its first explication of the provision's substantive content, the Court ob-
served that:
[Tlhe moving force behind the new constitutional provision was a more focused
privacy concern, relating to the accelerating encroachment on personal freedom
and security caused by increased surveillance and data collection activity in con-
temporary society. The provision's primary purpose is to afford some measure of
protection against this most modern threat to personal privacy.
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zoning suggests that the court's interpretation may be in a state of
flux.
Regardless of its ultimate scope, the privacy rationale articulated
by the Adamson court prohibits zoning regulations which interfere
with one's choice as to household companions absent a compelling
governmental interest.72 Nevertheless, communities may continue to
enact zoning regulations that preserve family neighborhoods on the
basis of the Belle Terre mandate.73 To comply with the dual require-
ments, the Adamson court encouraged adoption of the zoning scheme
suggested by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Baker.74
California municipalities adopting the Baker plan will have to ad-
dress at least two threshold problems. First, although the "bona fide
housekeeping unit" is central to the plan,75 neither the Adamson nor
Baker court developed the substantive content of the concept.76 In
White v. Davis, 13 Cal.3d at 774, 533 P.2d at 233, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 105 (1975). Subse-
quent decisions affirmed this view. See People v. Privitera, 23 Cal.3d 697, 591 P.2d
919, 153 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1979) (the right to obtain drugs of unproven efficacy is not
encompassed by the right of privacy); Loder v. Municipal Court, 17 Cal.3d 859, 553
P.2d 624, 132 Cal. Rptr. 464 (1976) (a city's retention and dissemination of an individ-
ual's arrest record in connection with criminal charges that were subsequently dis-
missed for lack of prosecution did not violate the right of privacy). See generally
Note, City of Santa Barbara v. A1damson 4n 4ssociational Right of Privacy and the
End of Family Values, 69 CAL. L. REv. 1052 (1981).
72. 27 Cal.3d at 131, 610 P.2d at 440, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 543.
73. See GODSCHALK, supra note 1, at 81.
74. 27 Cal.3d at 133-34, 610 P.2d at 442, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 545. See notes 59-61
and accompanying text supra.
75. 81 N.J. at 109 n.3, 405 A.2d at 372-73 n.3. The "bona fide housekeeping unit"
is central in the sense that the term will identify those households permitted in single-
family districts. See notes 18-19 and accompanying text supra. The Baker-4damson
alternative to restrictive family definitions presumes a zoning scheme which classified
zoning districts by building type (i.e. single family, multiple family). See note 18
supra. Some commentators question the efficacy of such distinctions in light of
changes in the assumptions which underlie the district classifications. See WILLIAMS,
supra note 1, at § 51.02.
76. The,4damson opinion discussed the term only briefly. See 27 Cal.3d at 134,
610 P.2d at 442, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 545. In Baker the discussion was similarly trun-
cated, see 81 N.J. at 108-09, 405 A.2d at 372, but the court cited a number of decisions
relevant to the concept. See e.g. City of White Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d 300, 313
N.E.2d 756, 357 N.Y.S. 449 (1974) (see note 49 supra); Oliver v. Zoning Comm'n of
Chester, 31 Conn. Supp. 197, 326 A.2d 841 (C.P. 1974) (to determine whether group
home constitutes family, reference must be made to standards established by deputy
commissioner for such homes and by the building, fire, safety and public health
codes); Carroll v. City of Miami Beach, 198 So.2d 643 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967)
(religious novices under supervision of Mother Superior is a "family" since they
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order to effectively implement the decisions, courts following Adam-
son and Baker must explicate criteria which identify permissible
households.77
A second problem arises with respect to East Cleveland's proscrip-
tion of ordinances which interfere with extended family relation-
ships." To control overcrowding, the Baker scheme suggests that
occupants per household be limited in relation to, for example, bath-
room facilities.79 As applied to the Baker plan, East Cleveland can be
read to require that the regulation exempt households consisting of
related persons."0 Adamson would appear to prohibit such a distinc-
tion between households,8" divesting municipalities of the power to
control density in this manner.
8 2
Interestingly, the latter threshold problem may be unique to the
Adamson rationale. Under the Baker approach, municipalities may
carve out an exception in order to comply with East Cleveland. Since
less restrictive means are not available to further the city's interest
due to the conflicting constitutional constraints, an ordinance excus-
ing extended family groups to the extent necessary to comport with
East Cleveland may still comply with the substantial relation stan-
would live like any other family); Brady v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 2d 69, 19
Cal. Rptr. 242 (1962) (ordinance restricting dwelling units to "single family" con-
strued to mean persons living in the premises as a single housekeeping unit, and not
to require cosanguinity or affinity of household members).
77. The Baker court, of course, placed responsibility for defining the term upon
local officials. To avoid a case-by-case evolution of the appropriate definition, how-
ever, courts must articulate more specific guidelines than those provided by the .4dam-
son or Baker courts.
78. See note 45 and accompanying text supra.
79. See note 61 and accompanying text supra.
80. The regulations will, by design, operate on both related and unrelated groups.
The constitutional protection afforded related family groups by East Cleveland ap-
pears to require that municipalities using area and facility regulations carve out an
exception for households of related persons.
81. 27 Cal.3d at 134, 610 P.2d at 442, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 545.
82. See City of Chula Vista v. Pagard, 115 Cal. App.3d 785, 171 Cal. Rptr. 738
(1981) where an exasperated court, attempting to apply 4danson in light of East
Cleveland, said that cities desiring to promote neighborhoods addressed to family val-
ues and needs found themselves between the "federal Scylla" in East Cleveland and
the "State of California's Charybdis" in Adamson. Id at 798, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 746.
The court reluctantly invalidated an ordinance similar to Santa Barbara's, observing
that in order to comply with the Adamson and East Cleveland decisions, cities could
do little more than attempt to draft restrictions in a narrowly drawn, evenhanded
ordinance. Id at 800, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 747.
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dard required by New Jersey law.8" The Adamson holding, however,
permits exceptions only when justified by a compelling state inter-
est.' This higher standard precludes an easy compromise between
the two decisions.8"
The Adamson decision warrants criticism for its failure to consider
thoroughly its implications and rationale. While it shares with Baker
a rejection of Belle Terre,86 Adamson and Baker otherwise differ con-
siderably. One may view Baker as a logical extension of New Jersey
case law previously developed in exclusionary zoning cases.87 Adam-
son, however, lacks this foundation in California law. The Califor-
nia Supreme Court abruptly and without satisfactory explanation
altered its interpretation of the state constitution's privacy guarantee
to provide a basis for the decision.88 Recognizing that a municipality
may legitimately regulate density in a residential neighborhood, the
Adamson court failed to reconcile the constraints placed upon such
regulations by the privacy theory89 with the apparently conflicting
constraints demanded by the federal constitution. 0 Shortly after
decidingAdamson, the California Supreme Court had an opportunity
to address this tension. Unfortunately, the court chose not to.91
Nevertheless, Adamson stands as an important decision in zoning
law. Belle Terre inadequately considered the exclusionary effect re-
sulting from restrictive family definitions. Adamson, lke Baker,
83. See note 58 supra.
84. 27 Cal.3d at 131, 610 P.2d at 440, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 543.
85. The impasse, however, may not be insurmountable. East Cleveland may be
distinguished as a case concerned with an unusual ordinance directly interfering with
an extended family. Indirect interference from a regulation reasonably calculated to
control overcrowding may pass constitutional muster.
86. The Adamson court questioned whether Belle Terre remained good law in
light of East Cleveland. See 27 Cal. 3d at 130 n.3, 610 P.2d at 440 n.3, 164 Cal. Rptr.
at 543 n.3.
87. See note 53 supra.
88. See notes 70-71 and accompanying text supra.
89. See note 81 and accompanying text supra.
90. See notes 45 and 80 and accompanying text supra.
91. See City of Chula Vista v. Pagard, 115 Cal. App.3d 785, 171 Cal. Rptr. 738
(1981), -where the California Supreme Court, after granting a hearing on the appeal,
ordered the cause transferred to the lower court for reconsideration in light of
Adamson.
[Vol. 23:307
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol23/iss1/9
1982] RESTRICTIVE FAMILY DEFINITIONS 323
serves to mitigate unnecessarily arbitrary zoning classifications by
circumscribing the reach of a municipality's zoning powers.
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